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its attorneys. The public policy to protect
citizens from fraudulent and incompetent
legal advice remains an essential consideration. It is outweighed, however, by the
necessity of affording all citizens an equal
opportunity to obtain expert advice concerning complex federal laws and regulations. Although the holding of the present
case makes a significant inroad into the
province of state regulation of all attorneys
within its geographic bounds, it does not
undermine the state's power to regulate the
activities of attorneys in any critical fashion. Since the great majority of legal

problems arising within a state will of
necessity concern state, rather than federal,
law, all attorneys advising in these matters
will continue to be closely regulated by
their state. Those crossing state lines to
advise on merely federal matters will tend
to be attorneys whose opinion and reputation are valued and whose advice is competent. Furthermore, the actual practice
of law before federal courts remains completely subject to the judicial regulations of
the particular courts, and properly so, in
order to prevent any significant deterioration in the quality of the federal bar.

Homosexual Resident Alien
Deportable as a Psychopathic
Personality
Petitioner, a resident alien, was ordered
deported on the ground that, being a
homosexual at the time of his entry into
the United States, he was excludable under
Section 212(a) (4) of the Immigration
and Naturalization Act of 1952 1 as a
"psychopathic personality."
On appeal,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the term "psychopathic personality" was a legal word
of art which was clearly intended to include homosexuals, and, therefore, was not
unconstitutionally vague. Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 363
F.2d 488 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, U.S. -, 87 Sup. Ct. 285 (1966).
The power to deport is a weapon of
defense and reprisal and is inherent in

every sovereign state. 2 Congress, by virtue
of its constitutional authority to regulate
foreign commerce, has the power of deportation.3 In order to supplement this
power, Congress may also deny a person
admission to the United States, or impose
such reasonable restrictions on his ad4
mission as it deems proper.
This power to exclude and deport has
been utilized from the outset of our
government, and, to date, the basic pattern of the procedure has remained essentially the same. 5 The deportation of
undesirable aliens, however, became dormant after 1798, and the practice was not
re-established until 1888.6 Criteria for

' Immigration & Naturalization Act of 1952,

§212(a) (4), 66 Stat. 182, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)
(4) (1964).

2 Harisiades

v.
587-88 (1952).

Shaughnessy, 342

U.S.

580,

- Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04
(1889).
4United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
6Developments in the Law-Immigration and
Nationality, 66 HARV. L. REV. 643, 644-45

(1953).
6 Id. at 646.
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exclusion, however, continued to develop
over the years.
With regard to the exclusion of an alien,
there is no requirement that he be afforded due process of law-he is not even
entitled to a hearing. 7 Congress has plenary power to deny admission and to set
standards for admission.8 That due process is not required would seem to follow
naturally since exclusion deals with neither
citizens nor residents of this country.
Deportation presents an entirely different problem since a resident alien is living under our laws. It has been argued
that because of his residence, the alien is
entitled to the full protection of the Constitution in that "the Bill of Rights make
no exception in favor of deportation laws
or laws enacted pursuant to a 'plenary'
power. . . ."
This view, however, has
never been adopted by a majority of the
Supreme Court. While it is clear that all
constitutional guarantees do not apply to
deportation, the decisions of the Supreme
Court leave much doubt as to what safeguards do apply. Nevertheless, it was
early decided that there must be a hearing
in deportation cases, and that the hearing
must comply with the due process requirements of notice and opportunity to be
heard. 10 However, it has also been held
that the principles of res judicata do not
apply so as to bar a deportation hearing
after the alien has been adjudged admis-

United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537 (1950).
8 Id. at 542.
7

9Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945)
(concurring opinion).
10 Japanese Immigrant Case,
189 U.S. 86
(1903).

sible at the time of his entry.1
Recently, however, the Court has more
fully outlined the constitutional guarantees
which are applicable to deportation proceedings. In Jordan v. De George, the
Court, in determining what was meant
by a crime involving moral turpitude,
stated that the constitutional standard that
a statute cannot be overly vague was applicable to deportation, even though it
is a civil and not a criminal proceeding."
The following year, in Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy,13 the Court was faced with
the deportation of a resident alien because
of prior membership in the Communist
Party. Such membership had, however,
ended before the law making it a ground
for deportation had been enacted. The
Court held that an alien in a deportation
proceeding is not protected by the constitutional prohibition against an ex post
facto law, whatever its consequences, because deportation has always been a civil
proceeding, and the ex post facto provision applies only to legislation imposing
penal sanctions. 14 The Court further
stated that "any policy toward aliens is
. ..largely immune from judicial inquiry
or interference." :5
In 1917, the first major legislation was
enacted excluding allegedly inferior persons
for medical or psychological reasons. This
act provided that "persons of constitutional
psychopathic inferiority" were to be excluded from entry.'
Also, resident aliens

"1Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281, 284-85
(1906).
"2341 U.S. 223, 230-31 (1951).
"3342 U.S. 580 (1952).
14'd. at 594-95.
15 Id. at 588-89.
16

Act of Feb. 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 875.

13
could be deported if they were found to
have been excludable at the time of their
entry on certain enumerated grounds, including "constitutional psychopathic inferiority." 1'
There was, however, one
limitation on this deportation power, i.e.,
a resident alien could only be deported on
such grounds within five years after his
entry.18 This provided an important safeguard against the deportation of aliens who
had established themselves in this country
over a period of time exceeding five years.
In United States ex rel. Powlowec v.
Day,'9 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed an order of deportation
where conflicting medical testimony as to
the alien's mental state had been introduced. The court considered the choice
of differing psychiatric theories to be in
the hands of the Special Inquiry Officer
conducting the deportation hearing. The
court thus left to the administrative officer's discretion the task of determining
whether, based on the alien's acts after he
was admitted to the United States, it could
be said that he had the necessary condition
for deportation at the time he entered the
country.

I1 Act of Feb. 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 889.
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The great number of persons displaced
by World War II caused Congress to
recognize the need for modernization of
the law in this area.2 0 This resulted in
the passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, which changed the
grounds for exclusion from "constitutional
psychopathic inferiority" to "psychopathic
personality," and enumerated certain other
grounds as well. 21 Furthermore, the fiveyear limitation on the power to deport,
on the ground that the alien was exclud22
able at the time of entry, was removed,
thereby allowing such a deportation proceeding to be brought at any time.
The term "psychopathic personality"
was apparently intended by Congress to
include homosexuals. It was believed by
Congress that "the purpose of the provision against 'persons of constitutional
psychopathic inferiority' will be more adequately served by changing that term to
'persons afflicted with psychopathic personality,' and that the classes of mental
defectives should be enlarged to include
homosexuals and other sex perverts." 22
Furthermore, the rejection of a proposed
bill making specific reference to homosexuals,24 was declared "not to be construed as modifying the intent to exclude

18 Act of Feb. 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 889.

1 33 F.2d 267, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 594
(1929).
See Note, Limitations On Congressional Power To Deport Resident Aliens As
Psychopaths At Time O Entry, 68 YALE L.J.
931, 939 (1959). Accord, United States ex rel.

Leon v. Murff, 250 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1957),
affirming United States ex rel. Leon v. Shaughnessy, 143 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). It
should be noted, however, that Congress may
not constitutionally delegate to administrative
officials the authority to impose serious sanctions
unless it provides the officials with sufficiently
precise statutory guidelines.
Field v. Clark,
143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).

Supra note 5, at 646.
21 Immigration & Naturalization Act of 1952,
§ 212(a) (4), 66 Stat. 182, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)
(4) (1964). The grounds for exclusion were
psychopathic personality, epilepsy, and mental
defects.
22Immigration & Naturalization Act of 1952,
§ 241(a) (1), 66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)
(1) (1964).
23 S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. § 345
(1950).
24 S. 716, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 212(a) (1951).
20

RECENT DECISIONS

all aliens who are sexual deviates." 25
Although the legislative history is replete
with references to homosexuals, it is never
made certain whether all or only some
homosexuals are included. However, the
courts have been uniform in the determination that the term "psychopathic personality" includes at least some forms of
sexual deviate behavior."
The leading
definition of the term was stated by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, as
characterizing individuals "who habitually
misbehave so flagrantly that they are con'
tinually in trouble with authorities." 2
Under this definition, it would appear that,
only homosexuals who are public nuisances
would be included within the term.
In Fleuti v. Rosenberg,2" the Court of
S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. § 9
(1952). However, the intent of Congress as expressed in legislative reports is not necessarily
controlling. The void for vagueness doctrine
is premised in part on the fiction that all persons
25

in fact know the contents of statutes.

But this

fiction does not extend to the point of assuming

that persons in fact know the relatively inaccessible legislative history of statutes. Thus, it is
held that in applying the doctrine, a federal
statute must be judged on its face. United States
v. Harriss, 348 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). Nevertheless, the "long and successful administration

of a statute establishes patterns of social conduct to which interested parties may have become adjusted. . . . [Thus] the court may be
reluctant to upset a pattern of conduct which
the regulated parties have adopted and other
parties have to expect." Note, Due Process
Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62
HARV. L. REV. 77, 83 (1948).
26Quiroz v. Neelly, 291 F.2d 906 (5th Cir.
1961); United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237
F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1954).
27 United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, supra note
26, at 411.
28

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that
since the great weight of evidence as to the
alien's pre-entry condition was based on
post-entry conduct, the statute was too
vague for him to regulate his conduct
accordingly, and was therefore void. The
court, cognizant of defendant's two convictions on charges of sexual deviation,
nevertheless held that the alien could not
have regulated his post-entry conduct unless he had known that homosexuality was
a ground for deportation.
While the court in Fleuti seems to have
recognized the harshness inherent in deportation, it appears to have failed to reconcile its decision with two salient developments in this area of the law. First,
the alien, through his convictions, came
within the public nuisance definition of
"psychopathic personality" laid down
by
the Flores court.
Second, the court
neglected the fact that aliens do not have
the protection of the constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws. Thus,
while the "void for vagueness" doctrine
has been made applicable to deportation,
the doctrine would appear to be somewhat
irrelevant as far as the alien's conduct is
concerned since Congress may make any
act grounds for deportation, even after the
act has been committed. Since the alien
can be made subject to ex post facto laws,
it makes no difference whether he knew
what conduct was proscribed.
Whatever the court's reasoning, Congress felt compelled, because of Fleuti, to
amend the law, and in 1965 one of the
other grounds for exclusion, i.e., epilepsy,
was deleted from the statute, and "sexual
deviation" was added. 2" The purpose of

302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962), remanded on

other grounds, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).

29 Act

of Oct. 3, 1965, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 919.
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this amendment was clearly to resolve any
doubt as to what persons were excludable.8" It should be noted, however, that
even under the amended statute, whether
all sexual deviates, or only those who act
in public, should be deported remains unresolved.
In the instant case, 31 petitioner, a resi-

dent of this country since 1955, had been
gainfully employed since that date, and a
large segment of his family resided in this
country. In 1963, as part of his application for citizenship, he admitted having
been arrested for sodomy in 1959, the
charge subsequently having been dropped.
Upon further questioning, he freely admitted having had homosexual experiences
prior to his entry into this country. At a
deportation hearing, he declined to be examined by Public Health Service doctors
and instead submitted letters from two
privately retained psychiatrists. The letters stated that he had only a psychosexual
problem, that his sexual structure was
fluid (he could move easily from homosexual to heterosexual conduct) and that
his disorder was not in the context of a
psychopathic personality in the medical
sense. Based upon this evidence, and
upon the results of a Selective Service
psychiatric examination, the Special Inquiry Officer concluded that petitioner had
been a homosexual at the time of his entry

and was therefore excludable as a "psychopathic personality" in the legal sense.
The United States Court of Appeals,
after discussing the history of the deporta30
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tion act, determined that the term "psychopathic personality" was utilized by
Congress "not as a medical or psychiatric
formulation but as a legal term of art designed to preclude the admission of homosexual aliens into the United States." 32
The Court then went on to discuss the
Fleuti case, and decided that the "void for
vagueness" doctrine did not apply because
(1) the legislative intent shows that homosexuals were included within the act, and
(2) the purpose of the act was not to
regulate conduct, but rather to exclude
persons possessing a certain characteristic.33
The Court also attempted to distinguish
Fleuti on the grounds that here petitioner's
sworn admission was sufficient evidence
of a pre-entry condition. It rejected petitioner's other arguments that Public
Health Service certification of the pre-entry
condition as well as an examination by
them was necessary. This requirement applies only to exclusion proceedings at the
time of entry.
The dissenting opinion emphasized that
constitutional safeguards apply to deportation proceedings and that lack of any
medical evidence deprived the petitioner of
due process.34 Moreover, the intent of
Congress to exclude all homosexuals was
questioned in light of findings that thirtyseven per cent of the male American population, at some time, have had homosexual experience.1 5 Finally, the dissent
agreed with Fleuti that the term "psychopathic personality" was too vague, especially in view of the recent attention

S. Rep. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 19

(1965).
31 Boutilier v.
Immigration and Naturalization
Serv., 363 F.2d 488 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
U.S. (1966).

1967

321

d. at 494.

331d. at 495.
34 Id. at 496 (dissenting opinion).
q5

Id.

at 497.
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focused on sexual practices. 6
The instant case highlights the inconsistency of the law in the area of the rights
of aliens when subject to deportation proceedings. The Supreme Court has, by
implication, made the "void for vagueness" doctrine applicable to deportation
statutes.37 Thus, where the statute is so
vague that the alien is unable to regulate
his conduct accordingly, he cannot be deported for that conduct. But the Supreme Court has held that an alien is not
protected from ex post facto laws since
deportation is not a criminal punishment.
Therefore, it appears that any discussion
of whether or not a statute is too vague
for an alien to know what is prohibited
will be fruitless since, without ex post facto
protection, Congress may pass a law prohibiting certain conduct after the conduct
has been performed.
Assuming arguendo, however, that the
resident alien could not be deported under
a statute that is void for vagueness, it is
necessary to determine whether that doctrine applies to the instant case. It has
been said that if "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its mean88
ing and differ as to its application"

36 Id. at 499.
37

1Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
38 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391 (1926). To the extent that a statute
places a penalty on completed acts, concepts of

fairness require that it be sufficiently definite to
give notice as to what conduct is necessary to
avoid those penalties. Note, supra note 25, at
78. The concepts of vagueness are especially
relevant in the instant case as the requirement

that a statute give notice as to what conduct
is proscribed applies only in those instances
where the penalized person could have performed differently had he wished. Thus where
sexual deviation is purely voluntary and is not

the statute is too indefinite. The term
"psychopathic personality" is by no means
definite in any context. Even if one accepts this as a legal word of art, is the
man of "common intelligence" able to
guess that homosexuality is included? It
seems not. In our society, with an expanding awareness of, and changing attitudes toward sex and psychological problems, its meaning is at least doubtful.
There is no longer a single classification
into which we can squeeze all the mentally
ill. Furthermore, with the publicity surrounding new work in this area, prompting
the dissent to cite the fact that thirty-seven
per cent of American males have had
some homosexual experiences, it can be
easily seen that the average person would
be confused by the term "psychopathic
personality."
Another argument is that the statute is
too vague for a valid adjudication of the
condition, thereby depriving the alien of
due process in the deportation proceeding.
As previously indicated, the Special Inquiry Officer, an administrative official, has
been given great power in determining
the evidence and drawing conclusions.
Even though the Officer is given a manual directing that homosexuals be included,
it still gives him no answer to the question
whether all homosexuals are "psychopathic
personalities." This is especially true in
light of the "public nuisance" theory of
Flores, whereby only those homosexuals

due to a compulsive form of mental disease, the
statute would have to give such notice. Pearson
v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
It
must be remembered that in the instant case,
the alien homosexual's conduct was purely voluntary, and could have been controlled had he
desired to do so.

13
in constant trouble with the authorities
would be deported .3" As the due process
requirements of notice and opportunity to
answer the charges are required in deportation proceedings, a more concrete test
is needed to give the administrative official
a guide sufficiently free from vagueness.
The entire area of deportation presents
a unique problem. Clearly, the alien is
being penalized for a condition existing at
the time of entry-a valid exercise of
governmental power to exclude whomever
they wish-but this condition is premised
on acts committed within the country, and
therefore similar to criminal punishment
for some proscribed conduct. Deportation,
not exclusion, is at issue and, similar to
exile, can operate in some cases even more
harshly than criminal penalties. In the
instant case, it is evident that the penalty
of deportation might never have been imposed had the alien not applied for citizenship.
It must be remembered that the alien
was a resident for eight years before any
deportation proceeding was brought against

note 26.
In the instant case, for
example, the alien was arrested but once, was
never convicted and had no other dealings with
the authorities.
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him. Most of our criminal statutes have
a period of limitation yet Congress has
allowed deportation to be imposed at
any time to correct an error in admission.
When, as in the instant case, homosexuality, which is believed to be an illness,
is involved, an interesting comparison can
be made to the Supreme Court decision
in Robinson v. California, wherein it was
held that the conviction of a person for
the "status" crime of being a drug addict
was unconstitutional as cruel and unusual
punishment. 40 Presently, however, no matter how severe the sanction of deportation
may be, the Supreme Court has not yet
chosen to recognize that, if not actually a
punishment, it is so closely analogous to
it in substance that it deserves some of
the same protections.
While the choice of whom to admit is
rightfully left to Congress, there is little
doubt that changes are needed in the area
of deportation. If we are to deny an alien
the full protection of the laws that he is
living under, he should at least have the
right to know what conduct is proscribed,
and a time limit such as was found in the
Act of 1917 should be re-established.

"' Supra

40 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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DIVORCE REFORM
(Continued)
tack by the full faith and credit clause
of the United States Constitution. The
statute does not authorize such attack.
It merely lays down a rule of evidence
relative to the proof of the domicile
of the procurer of a foreign divorce.
Where the Constitution precludes any
litigation concerning the procurer's domicile, the statute has no application.
Full faith and credit permits collateral
attack on a foreign ex parte divorce so
the statute is applicable in this case.
Although an ex parte divorce obtained
within the United States may be subjected
to collateral attack, there is a constitutional
presumption of its validity. It has been
argued that the statute is unconstitutional
because it creates a presumption of invalidity in lieu of the presumption of
validity required by full faith and credit.
The constitutional presumption of validity is a rebuttable one. It is the writer's
belief that the statute merely provides

FAMILY PLANNING
(Continued)
I have one fundamental proposal to make.
The sensitive nature of the subject matter
and the dangerous potentialities for control which are present suggest that careful
governmental supervision is required. Administrative determination should not proliferate; private programs cannot be cut
adrift. Without a central authority exercising responsible control, it becomes impossible for legitimate criticisms ever to
catch up with the facts. This is true of

that, as a matter of law, proof of certain
facts rebuts the presumption of validity
and that this is permissible. But even
were the statute unconstitutional, it would
not make much difference. The cases hold
that, even without such a statute as the
one in question, proof of facts similar to
those specified by the statute is sufficient
to rebut the presumption of validity.
Hence, ex parte United States divorces
are as vulnerable to attack without, as
with the statute.
Nor does the statute overrule the
decision of Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel.2 The
point of that case is that New York
recognizes a bilateral Mexican divorce
obtained in a proceeding at which the
plaintiff was physically present regardless
of the domicile of the spouses. Proof
that the procurer of such a divorce was
domiciled in New York when he commenced the divorce action is immaterial;
such a divorce is valid anyway.

16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d
86 (1965).

2

both domestic and international programs.
Hence, I suggest that, at the federal level,
a special congressional subcommittee be
established to supervise and oversee initial
federal programs, to require and evaluate
reports, and to seek continuing evidence
as to the practical effects of the programs.28
Religious and Political Values in
2 Hanley,
Population Policies. Paper presented before
National Conference on Family Planning; Partners for Progress, Washington, D.C., May 6,
1966.

13
Besides the advantage of being able
to provide "a central authority exercising
responsible control" over the administration of such programs, federal legislation
could also advantageously provide for a
more coordinated effort. As indicated by
Fr. Hanley:
I think that the matter is too important
and delicate to be left to piecemeal efforts
by governmental agencies, whether acting
by themselves or in cooperation with
29
private groups.
In view of the present concern and
trends in this country for family-planning
programs, it seems likely that renewed efforts will be made in the 90th Congress
to enact appropriate legislation. And,
even if the suggestion of Fr. Hanley were
adopted, there would still remain problems, such as the working out of administrative procedures, etc., to avoid coercion, direct or indirect, and invasions of
privacy, but in the words of Mr. Ball,
this "is an area [avoiding coercion] for
searching discussion by lawyers" 10 and

29
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"if we are to have government birth control in any stable form in the future, now
is the time to be civilizing it and lawyers
must be the conscience of the movement
to do so." 31

Furthermore, as indicated above, there
would be moral questions for Catholics
that would have to be examined, such as
the types of public family-planning programs they could support, the extent to
which they could cooperate in the administration of such programs, and who the
recipients may be (e.g., only the married,
or also unmarried women who already
have a family of illegitimate children).
These are questions for renewed and careful analysis by Catholic moral theologians
in light of present conditions, so that the
results of their deliberations may help
Catholic lay leaders in the public forum
to enter into a more enlightened and
fruitful dialogue with others, in trying
to reach a satisfactory resolution of the
present uncoordinated and piecemeal efforts.

Ibid.

30 Ball, supra note 5, at 221.

STATUE TO ST. THOMAS MORE
(Continued)
deemed himself, "The king's good servant, but God's servant first," we who
labor Jn the tradition of the common law
must deem it a happy duty to contribute

31 Id. at 267.

generously to the memorial fund. Thus
upon a new and lasting platform may
England and all the world look up literally as well as figuratively to a permanent
reminder that sanctity and eminence in
the law are eternally compatible.

NATURAL LAW

NATURAL LAW
(Continued)
Ford and Gerald Kelly, writing at an
earlier date, proposed three criteria: the
verbal formulas used in the pronouncements, the intention of the speaker, and
46
the historical context of the document.
Utilizing these various criteria, which overlap to some extent, one can readily conclude that many teachings of the Church
based on natural law possess strong binding force. Pope Pius XII's condemnations
of therapeutic abortion, euthanasia, and
artificial insemination, and Vatican II's
condemnation of indiscriminate acts of
war directed against entire cities or extensive areas together with their civilian
47
populations fall into this category.

As a general rule, greater stress falls
on such specific moral conclusions based on
natural law than on the systematic explanation of the principles from which they
are derived. Certain theoretical teachings,
it is true, receive repeated emphasis; for
example, those on the objectivity, substantial immutability, universality, and
basic knowability of natural law. The
core content of these teachings, as I have
said, constitutes an article of faith. Besides these rather basic assertions, another body of statements on specific moral
conclusions demands "religious submission
of mind and will." In my opinion, most
statements about the derivation of specific
natural law obligations and about the philosophical explanation of natural law are
non-obligatory, for they do not professedly
intend to teach the doctrine as Catholic.

46 FORD-KELLY, op. cit. supra note 26, at 28-32.
47 See Address to the Italian Catholic Union of

National
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